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holic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 
Cal., 81 Cal.Rptr. 241, 459 P.2d 657, it 
is my opinion that the prohibition in sec-
tion 24755.1 against license suspension or 
revocation is unconstitutional because it 
limits and impairs the constitutional power 
to suspend or revoke licenses granted the 
Department by the second sentence of, the 
fifth paragraph of section 22 of article 
XX. I further conclude that since the 
provisions of section 24755.1 are clearly 
inseverable, the entire section is inoper-
ative. The licensee's argument that the 
section has vitality here must therefore 
fall. 
I would affirm the decision of the De-
partment. 
TOBRINER, J., concurs. 
Rehearing denied; TOBRINER and 
SULLIVAN, JI., dissenting. 
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81 Ca1.Rptr. 264 
The PEOPLE, Plalnllff and Respondent, 
v. 
Roland TIJERINA, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Cr. 1.3547. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Oct. 24, 1969. 
Appeal from order of the Los Angeles 
County Superior Court, Patrick Coleman, 
Court Commissioner, J. Pro Tem., revoking 
probation and from judgments of conviction 
of grand theft and petty theft with a prior 
felony conviction. The Supreme Court, 
Traynor, C. J., held, inter alia, that the or-
der revoking the probation of defendant 
was void on the ground that no stipulation 
was entered into permitting court commis-
sioner, who revoked the probation, to act as 
a temporary judge in the case. 
Order revoking probation reversed, 
judgment of conviction affirmed, and ap-
peal from order denying new trial dis-
missed 
Opinion vacated, CaI.App., 77 CaI.Rptr. 
82. 
I. Larceny ¢:::359 
Absent proof that price charged by 
retail store from which merchandise is 
stolen does not accurately reflect value 
of the merchandise in the retail market, 
that price is sufficient to establish the value 
of the merchandise within meaning of Penal 
Code. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 484, 487, 
487, subd. 1. 
2. Larceny P62(2) 
In grand theft prosecution, the evi-
dence, including testimony of a store secu-
rity officer that he was informed when 
someone had permission to remove mer-
chandise and that he had not been told that 
defendant had such permission, was suf-
ficient to establish that merchandise in 
question was taken by defendant without 
consent of the department store. 
3. Jury P29(6) 
Where defendant was represented by 
an attorney at both the preliminary hearing, 
and at trial, where defendant was carefully 
questioned before his waiver of a jury 
trial was accepted, and where he stated that 
he knew what a jury trial was and was 
also told that "That is when twelve people 
sit over here in the box and hear all the evi-
dence," the court was not required to fur-
ther explain to defendant the significance 
of his waiver of a jury trial 
4. CrImInal Law PI023(13) 
Order denying a new trial is not ap-
pealable. 
5 •. CrImInal Law $=>1201 
Penal Code section which provides for 
an increased penalty based on a prior felony 
conviction is not unconstitutional. West's 
Ann.Pen.Code, § 667. 
PEOPLE v. TIJERINA Cal. 681 
Cite as 459 P.2d 680 
6. Larceny *'>12 
Failure of defendant, who was ap-
pI ehended in department store after he had 
taken a paper hag from his pocket and put 
a cashmere coat into it, to successfully re· 
move the coat from the store dig not render 
the theft incomplete. West's Ann.Pen. 
Code, § 667. 
7. Criminal Law *,>1023(12) 
Order 'revoking probation was appeal-
able as an "order made after judgment, af-
fecting the substantial rights of the party". 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1237, suhd. 2. 
8. Criminal Law ®:>982.9(6) 
Order revoking the probation of de-
fendant was void on the ground that no 
stipulation was entered into permitting 
court commissioner, who revoked the proba-
tion, to act as a temporary judge in the 
case. West's Ann.Const. art. 6, § 21; 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1237, subd. 2; 
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 259a, subd. 4; 
Ca!.Rules of Court, rule 244. 
Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. 
James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mark A. Iven-
er, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Ed-
ward H. Gaylord, Asst. County Counsel, 
and Jean Louise Webster, Deputy County 
Counsel, as amici curiae on behalf of plain-
tiff and respondent. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
In these appeals defendant challenges 
judgments and orders entered against him 
in three cases on January 31, 1968. A court 
commissioner acted as a temporary judge 1 
in all three cases. In No. A-ZZ0328 and No. 
A-226235 the commissioner acted pursuant 
to stipulation of defendant and counsel and 
I. Article VI of the California' Constitu-
tion was amended in 1966 to substitute 
the phrase "temporary judge" for Ujudge 
pro tempore." (I 21 superseding former 
459 P.2d--43Va 
appointment by the court, and no conten-
tion is made that he was not empowered to 
act in those cases. In No. 307540, however, 
no stipulation was entered into authorizing 
the commissione~ to act, and his order re-
voking probation in that case is challenged 
on that ground. 
In No. A-ZZ0328 defendant was found 
gnilty of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, suhd. 
1) and sentenced to prison for the term pre-
scribed by law. He appeals from the judg-
ment. 
By stipulation the case was submitted on 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
Joe Mena, a security agent for the Broad-
way Department Store, was told that on 
several successive Monday nights between 
7 :30 and 8 a person entered the store with 
a box on his head or on his shoulders. On 
Monday evening, March ZI, 1967, Mena saw 
defendant walk through the store and use a 
stairway marked 'fEmployees Only." Mena 
alerted his partner, Walter Johnson. About 
35 minutes later they saw defendant leaving 
the store with a large box on his head. As 
they followed, defendant looked back in 
their direction, dropped the box, and started 
to run. After a three or four minute chase, 
Mena and Johnson caught him. The box 
contained 46 packages of men's undershorts 
priced at $5 a package, two sweaters priced 
at $20 each, and one sweater priced at $16.-
99. The box also contained 13 men's sport 
shirts and 17 packages of undershorts, the 
price of which does not appear. 
[1] Defendant contends that the retail 
price of the property does not establish 
its "reasonable and fair market value" 
(Pen.Code, § 484) and that the evidence is 
therefore insufficient to support a convic-
tion of grand theft for the taking of prop-
erty worth more than $ZOO. (Pen. Code, § 
487, subd. 1.) In the absence of proof, 
however, that the price charged by a retail 
store from which merchandise is -stolen does 
not accurately reflect the value of ~he mer-
• 5; .see Proposed Revision (1966), Cal. 
Constitution Revision Com., p. 98; 1967 
Report of Judicial Council, pp. 89--90.) 
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chandise in the retail market, that price is 
sufficient to establish the value of the mer· 
chandise within the meaning of sections 484 
and 487. (People v. Cook (1965) 233 Cal. 
App.2d 435, 438, 43 Ca1.Rptr. 646.) 
[2] Defendant also contends that the 
evidence is insufficient to establish that the 
merchandise was taken without the consent 
of the department store. There is no merit 
in this contention. One of the security of-
ficers testified that he was informed when 
someone had permission to remove meor-
chandise and that he had not been told that 
defendant had such permission. Moreover, 
the manDer of the taking, defendant's drop-
ping the box on being discovered, his flight, 
and the absence of a sales slip are also 
evidence of lack of consent. 
[3] Defendant asserts that his waiver 
of the right to a jury trial was ineffective, 
on the ground that he was not told that 
a jury's verdict must be unanimous. De· 
fendant was represented by an attorney at 
both the preliminary hearing and at the 
trial, and he was carefully questioned be· 
fore his waiver of a jury trial was ac-
cepted." He stated that he knew what a 
2. "MISS FRIEDENBERG [Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney]: Mr. Tijerina, you under-
stand that in this case now before the 
Court, No. A 220328, you're entitled to a 
jury trial to determine your guilt or in-
nocence in this matter, .and you're also 
entitled to a jury trial to determine wheth-
er the prior felony convictions that have 
been alleged are true or false; do you un-
derstand that'l 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: Do you 
know what a jury trial is? 
HTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: That is 
when twelve people sit over here in the 
box and hear all the evidence. 
"You can. give up your right to the jury 
trial and have the judge sitting alone de-
termine all the issues in this case. What 
is your desire? Do you want a court trial 
or a jury trial? 
"THE DEFENDANT: Court trial. 
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: All right. 
You waive your right to jury trial at this 
time on all the issues? 
''THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
"MRS. KIPPEN [Deputy Public De-
fender]: Join in the waiver. 
jury trial was, and he was also told that 
"That is when twelve people sit over here 
in. the box 'and hear all the evidence." Un-
der these circumstances, the court was not 
required to explain further to defendant the 
significance of his waiver of a jury trial. 
(People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal.2d 425, 
432,341 P.2d 303; People v. Golston (1962) 
58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539, 25 Cal.Rptr. 83, 375 
P.2d 51; People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal. 
2d 307, 311, 57 Ca1.Rptr. 608, 425 P.2d 208.) 
[4] In No. A-226235 defendant was 
found guilty of petty theft with a prior 
conviction of a felony. (Pen.Code, § 667.) 
His motion for a new trial was denied, and 
he was sentenced to prison for the term 
prescribed by law. He appeals from the 
order denying his motion for new trial and 
from the judgment. The appeal from the 
order must be dismissed. (People v. Ing 
(1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 614, 55 Ca1.Rptr. 902, 
422 P.2d 590; Pen.Code, § 1237.) 
By stipulation the case was submitted on 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
and the superior court file of the prior con· 
viction (No. 307540) of an assault with a 
deadly weapon. (Pen.Code, § 245.) 
UMISS FRIEDENBERG: People join 
in the waiver. 
"Mr. Tijerina, it has also been suggested 
that we submit the case, particularly with 
regard to count 2, [the grand theft charge] 
on the basis of the testimony that was 
given at the preliminary hearing. Do 
you remember being present at the pre-
liminary hearing? 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: You re-
member your attorney cross~examining the 
witnesses who testified against you? 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: Now if we 
submit it to the judge on the transcript, 
this meaIlS he just reads the testimony 
of the witnesses who testified and con-
siders that evidence in arriving at his de-
cision. Is this procedure agreeable with 
you? 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: This means 
that the witnesses won't again come into 
court and be sworn and testify. 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
"MISS' FRIEDENBERG: AU right." 
PEOPLE Y. TIJERINA 
Cite as 4159 P .2d 680 
Cal. 683 
Shortly after the closing hour on October 
12, 1967, a saleslady at the J. W. Robinson 
Department Store saw defendant looking at 
merchandise. The next day a pile of mer-
chandise was discovered by a store detective 
on a platform next to a stairway restricted 
to emergency use by eRlployees. A stake-
out was ordered. Shortly after noon, de-
fendant arrived, took a paper bag from his 
pocket, and put a cashmere coat from the 
pile of merchandise into the bag. He was 
apprehended in the store. He did not have 
a sales slip for -the coat, which was on sale 
for $88, and he had not been given per-
mission to take it or any of the merchandise 
in the pile. 
Defendant claims that he did not ef-
fectively waive his right to a jury trial. He 
personally waived his right to a jury trial 
in this case the day after he waived his 
right to a jury trial in No. A-220328. Al-
though the inquiry at the time of the waiver 
was more limited 3 than that in No. A-
220328, our holding in that case also ap-
plies here. 
[5] Defendant contends that section 667 
of the Penal Code 4 is unconstitutional in 
providing for an increased penalty based on 
a prior felony _ conviction. It is settled, 
however, that section 667 and similar stat-
utes are not unconstitutional. (People v. 
Dutton (1937) 9 Ca1.2d 505, 507, 71 P.2d 
218; People v. Biggs (1937) 9 Cal.2d 508, 
512,71 P.2d 214; People v. Quiel (1945) 68 
3. "THE COURT: Commissioner Coleman 
is available for the trial of this ease. 
"Mr. Tijerina, do you waive your right 
to a jury trial and consent to be tried by 
Commissioner Coleman rather than by a 
jury? 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your HOJ1~ 
or. I 
"THE COURT: ,You are entitled ~ 
have a judge of the Superior Court presid~ 
over your court trial. Do you waive that 
right and consent that the commissioner, 
Commissioner Coleman, hear the matter 
rather than a Superior Court judge? 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
"MR. FISCHER [Deputy Public De-
fender]: Counsel waives, also. 
"THE COURT: People waive? 
Cal.App.2d 674, 680, 157 P.2d 446; People v. 
Collins (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 295, 301, 342 
P.2d 370.) 
[6] . Defendant maintains that the theft 
was not completeJ}}u ,the ground that he did 
not succeed in removing the coat from the 
store. Unlike the defendant in People 
v. Meyer (1888) 75 Cal. 383, 17 P. 431, 
who attempted to steal an overco~t that was 
~hained to a clothing store dummy, defend-
ant reduced the cashmere coat to his pos-
session. ·His subsequent failure to remove 
the coat from the store did not render the 
theft incomplete. (People v. Quiel, supra, 
68 CaI.App.2d 674, 679, 157 P.2d 446; Peo-
ple v. Dukes (1936) 16 Ca1.App.2d 105, 108-
109,60 P.2d 197.) 
[7] In No. 307540 defendant pleaded 
guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. 
Code, § 245). On March 28, 1966, he was 
sentenced to prison for the term prescribed 
by law, but execution of sentence was sus-
pended and he was placed on probation for 
two years on condition that he spend the 
first 90 days in jail. As pointed out above, 
the file in this case was presented to the 
commissioner on January 31, 1968, to prove 
defendant's prior conviction as an element 
of the crime charged in No. A-226235. De-
fendant does not challenge the 1966 judg-
ment or the order granting probation in No. 
307540. His attack is on the commissioner's 
revocation of probation in that case. De-
fendant requested a continuance of three to 
"MR. GERAGOS [Deputy District At· 
torney] : Yes, I will waive and join in 
that stipulation. 
"THE COURT: This is going to be 
submitted on the transcript? 
"MR. FISCHER: Yes, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: No additional testi-
mony? 
"MR. FISCHER: No." 
4. "Every person who, having been convict-
ed of any felony either in this State or 
elsewhere, and having served a term there-
for in any penal institution or having 
been imprisoned therein as a condition of 
probation for such offense, commits petty 
theft after such conviction, is punishable 
therefor by imprisonment in the county 
jail not exceeding one year or in the State 
prison not exceeding five years." 
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four weeks to obtain private counsel to 
represent him in the probation revocation 
proceedings. The temporary judge denied 
the motion for continuance, revoked proba-
tion, and ordered into effect the original 
1966 sentence of imprisonment in the state 
prison for the term prescribed by law. The 
order is erroneously labelled a judgment, 
and defendant's notice of appeal states that 
it is from the judgment entered against him 
in No. 307540 on January 31, .1%8. The 
order is appealable, however, as ~ 'Iorder 
made after judgment, affecting the sub-
stantial rights of the party" (Pen. Code, § 
1237, suhd. 3, now subd. 2), and defendant's 
notice of appeal will be construed to refer 
to it. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 
143, 145,271 P.2d 872.) 
(8) Defendant contends that the order 
is void on the ground that no stipulation 
was entered into permitting the commis-
sioner to act as a temporary judge in the 
case in which it was entered. We agree 
with this contention. 
As revised in 1966, section 21 of article 
VI of the California Constitution provides: 
"On stipulation of the parties litigant the 
court may order a cause to be tried by a 
temporary judge who is a ~ember of the 
5. Section 5 of article VI, as it read prior 
to 1966, provided: 
"Upon stipulation of the parties liti-
gant or their attorneys of record a cause 
in the superior court or in a municipal 
court may be tried by a judge pro tempore 
who must be a member of the bar sworn 
to try the cause, and who shall be em-
powered to aet in such capacity in the 
cause tried before him until the final de-
termination thereof. The selection of such 
judge pro tempore shall be subject to 
the approval and order of the court in 
which said cause is pending and shall also 
be subject to such regulations and orders 
as may be prescribed by the Judicial 
Council" 
6. Rule 244. Selection, qualification and 
trial by judge pro tempore. 
U(a) The stipUlation of parties litigant 
that a case may be tried by a judge pro 
tempore shall be in writing and shall set 
out in full the name and office address 
State Bar, sworn and empowered to act un~ 
til final determination of the cause." 
The purpose -of the Constitution Revision 
Commission in proposing this revision was 
to restate the substance of the existing 
section (then art. VI, § 5)' concisely in 
modern terms (see~Proposed Revision, su~ 
pra, fn. 1, p. 98; Estate of Soforenko 
(1%8) 260 CaLApp.2d 765, 766, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 563) and to extend the authority 
to use temporary judges to justice courts. 
(See 1967 Judicial Council Report. p. 89.) 
Both before and after the 1966 revision of 
article VI, however, a stipulation of the 
parties was constitutionally required for one 
not occupying the office of judge to serve 
as a temporary judge. (In re Chapman 
(1956) 141 CaLApp.2d 387, 390, 295 P.2d 
573; In re Wales (1957) 153 CaLApp.2d 
117, 119, 315 P.2d 433.) To the extent that 
Martin v. Martin (1%3) 215 Cal.App.2d 
338, 339, 30 CaLRptr. 293, is to the contrary, 
it is disapproved. 
There is nothing in Code of Civil Pro~ 
cedure, section 259a, subdivision 4 or in 
rule 244. of the California Rules of Court 
contrary to our conclusion herein. Sub-
division 4 of section 259a authorizes any 
court commissioner in Los Angeles County 
to act as a temporary judge "when other.-
of the member of the State Bar agreed 
upon to act as judge pro tempore, and 
shall be submitted to the presiding judge. 
or to the judge in whose department the 
case is pending in courts which do not 
have a presiding judge. If the member 
of the State Bar agreed upon consents 
so to act and if his selection is approved 
by the judge. the approval and order 
designating the person selected as judge 
pro tempore shall be endorsed upon the 
stipulation, which shall thereupon be filed. 
The judge pro tempore so selected shall 
take and subscribe the oath of office, 
which shall be attached to the stipulation 
and order of approval, and the case shall 
thereupon be assigned to said judge pro 
tempore for trial. At any time after the 
filing of the oath, the judge pro tempore 
may proceed with the hearing, trial and 
determination of the case. 
"(b) Subdivision (a) of this rule does 
not apply to the selection of a court com-
missioner to act as a judge pro tempore." 
PEOPLE T. TIJERINA 
Cite as 459 P.2d 680 
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wise qualified so to act and when appointed 
for that purpose." Rule 244 sets forth the 
procedure for appointing a member of the 
State Bar to act as a temporary judge and 
excepts from its requirements the selection 
of a court commissioner to act as a tern· 
porary judge. Neither the rule nor the 
statute purports to authorize a court com-
missioner to act as, a temporary judge if 
he is not "otherwise qualified $0 to ,act," 
and in the absence of a stipulation of the 
parties, he is not so qualified. 
Since there was no stipulation authorizing 
the commissioner to act as' a· temporary 
judge in No. 307540, the order revoking pro-
bation must ·be reversed. and since defend-
anes probationary period expired on March 
28, 1968, no orde~ pi revocation can now be 
made (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 
346-347,62 Cal.Rptr. 1,431 P2d 625.) 
In No. 307540, the order revoking proba-
tion is reversed. 
In No. A-220328, the judgment is af-
firmed. 
In No. A-226235,' the appeal from the 
order denying a new_, trial is dismissed, and 
the judgment is affirmed. 
McCOMB, PETERS, TOBRINER, 
MOSK, BURKE, and SULLIVAN, JI., 
concur. 
